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This paper reviews prior research by agricultural economists on the demand for food products
using scanner data. Thereafter, a differentiated product’s oligopoly model with Bertrand price
competition is developed and used to specify brand level demand and oligopoly price reaction
equations. The model has sufficient detail to estimate brand level price elasticities and price
response elasticities which in turn can be used to estimate three indices of market power. The
first index estimated is the familiar Rothschild Index. The paper develops estimates two new
indexes, the observed index and the Chamberlainquotient for tacit collusion. It concludes with
comments on how the proposed method for the measurement of market power in a
differentiated oligopoly can be improved.
I. Introduction
During the 1980s scanning of grocery prices from
the universal product codes on packages became
common in the nation’s supermarkets. With the
wide scale adoption of computerized tracking of
price and volume movement the food industry now
operates in an entirely new and revolutionary mar-
keting and distribution environment. Wal-Mart,
for example, attributes a significant portion of its
competitive advantage to its centralized inventory
management and market analysis system. Check-
out scanners in each Wall-Mart store instanta-
neously send point of sale information to the Ben-
tonville headquarters. Wal-Mart cuts store and
warehouse inventory levels to pipeline levels and
evaluates marketing strategies on a weekly or even
daily basis. They negotiate with suppliers and
compete against competitors from a position of
power based in part upon superior knowledge and
low cost operation.
Food manufacturers also have garnered signifi-
cant advances in the planning, implementation,
and monitoring of their distribution and marketing
strategies, Because there are real economies of
scale and scope in data processing no individual
retailer has sufficient incentive to process scanner
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data into a usable format for manufacturers. Two
third party firms, A.C. Neilsen and Information
Resources, Inc. (IRI) provide virtually all scanner
based data services to food manufacturing firms.
Neilsen and IRI provide food manufacturers with
summary data, however, their primary output is
on-line software that allows marketing managers
access to proprietary IRI or A.C. Neilsen analyti-
cal programs as well as data to generate useful
reports.
Each company offers two basic types of scanner
data services. The first measures product flow
through supermarkets. It is based upon a sample of
several thousand supermarkets and projects prod-
uct movement in physical units, market share,
prices, and merchandising activities for local mar-
ket areas, eg., Boston, and for the entire U.S.
Merchandising activity includes the percent of a
product sold on aisle end display, the percent sold
that was featured in retailers’ local newspaper ads,
and the percent price reduction when a product is
on special. These data allow manufacturers to
monitor “retailer push” trade promotion activities
that manufacturers offer as deals to retailers. A.C.
Neilsen calls its supermarket movement data base
Neilsen Scantrack. The IRI counterpart is the In-
foscan data base that serves as the basis for a reg-
ular feature on product marketing in the Wall
Street Journal.
The second general type of commercial scanner
data base is the household panel. Both Neilsen and
IRI maintain household panels with more than
15,000 participants. A panel allows food manufac-126 October 1994 Agricultural and Resource Economics Review
turers or other market analysts to evaluate “con-
sumer pull” as opposed to “retailer push” mar-
keting programs. The most important consumer
pull strategies are manufacturer advertising (TV,
radio, and print) and manufacturer coupons that
are distributed directly to consumers.
This paper will focus primarily upon aggregate
supermarket movement data (IRI Infoscan) be-
cause it enables analysis of strategic interactions
between brands and companies on a local market
and/or national level. 1 Perhaps from a demand
analysis perspective one would prefer the house-
hold level data, however, as we will see, the ag-
gregate market level data do seem to allow estima-
tion of demand curves for individual food prod-
ucts, and even brand level demand curves. For
example, I will present brand level demand elas-
ticities for carbonated soft drinks, including Coke
and Pepsi, and Dr. Pepper.
The basic thesis of the paper is that the avail-
ability of these new commercial scanner data now
allows significant advances in our understanding
of food marketing because one can now estimate
firm and brand level as well as market or commod-
ity demand models. The analysis can be done
within the framework of a differentiated product
oligopoly model that incorporates “supply side”
conduct that may not be competitive.
The paper is organized as follows. The next sec-
tion reviews prior scanner based demand and in-
dustrial organization research to set the stage for
the current research opportunities. Section three
provides examples of the IRI Infoscan data for
three products. They are from the University of
Connecticut, Food Marketing Policy Center IRI
Infoscan data set. It contains quarterly data for
most branded and private label grocery products in
local IRI market areas as well as the total U.S. for
1988–1992. The examples will illustrate possibil-
ities for research including brand level demand
analysis, the impact of a merger upon retail prices,
and farm to retail price transmission analysis. Sec-
tion Four will oufiine one approach to a detailed
analysis of brand level demand and oligopoly price
relationships. The approach provides brand level
own and cross-price elasticities, supply side price
reaction elasticities, and a new, more detailed
measurement of market power. Currently,
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Langan and Hong Wen, doctoral candidates, are
working with me on a large scale project at the
University of Connecticut Food Marketing Policy
Center that uses IRI data to analyze several indus-
tries including soft drinks, beer, bottled water, cat-
sup, cottage cheese, and cold breakfast cereal. The
soft drink results reported here are provisional and
as such should not be used for policy analyses
because we are still developing our models and
econometric methods. Nonetheless, they illustrate
the type of new theories and empirical insights that
scanner data will support.
II. Prior Research with Scanner Data
Demand Analysis
A.C. Neilsen, IRI, and their clients in the food
industries have estimated brand and product cate-
gory demand relationships; however, very few of
these studies are public. Neilsen and IRI data have
been systematically collected only since 1987 and
they are available to public only for a fee if at all.2
The Marketing Science Institute, Cambridge, Mas-
sachusetts has been a conduit for access to a lim-
ited amount of IRI panel data on coffee (Cooper
and Nakanishi, 1988, p, 254).
Among agricultural economists, researchers at
three different universities have collected raw
scanner data from cooperating local supermarkets
to estimate store level demand relationships. At
Cornell, McLaughlin and Lesser (1986) studied
potato sales in eight stores over a 42 week period.
They report consumer response to price changes is
relatively elastic.
At Texas A & M, Capps (1989) and Capps and
Nayga (1991) estimate demand relationships for
meat products. Capps analyzes weekly sales of
steak, ground beef, roast beef, chicken, pork
chops, ham and pork loin for all supermarkets of a
leading chain store in the Houston market. There
are 75 times series observations and the model is a
single equation, double log, specification with
pounds per customer as the dependent variable. It
also is specified as a lagged explanatory variable to
correct for autocorrelation and to account for habit
persistence. Cross price effects are only captured
by including an aggregate price for the other two
meat categories. A non beef price, for example, is
2 In addition the University of Connecticut purchase of quarterly In-
foscan data for all major branded food products 198f+1992, the Uni-
versityof Vermonthas purchasedquadweeklyInfoscandata for real and
imitation maple syrup products for four [RI mackets. Iskow et al. uses
these data to analyze sales of maple syrup.Cotlerill Scanner Data 127
included in each specific beef product demand
equation. Prices areassumed to be exogenous and
Zellner’s seemingly unrelated regression method is
used to estimate parameters. Homogeneity orsym-
metryrestrictions arenotimposed obtested. There
is no income variable; however, Capps notes that
this chain targets high income consumers. The
model contains demand shift variables including
local advertising. Capps reports significant own
price elasticities that are less than one except for
roast beef. Given the review bv Tellis (1988) of
product (not commodity or indu~try) level demand
studies, wherein own price elasticities are usually
in the 1.5 to 2.5 range, the Capps result seems low
to me. Most of Capps cross price elasticities are
significant and pos$ive.
At the University of Tennessee, Brooker and
Eastman have produced several publications ana-
lyzing item movement and demand for products.
They use weekly scanner data from five supermar-
kets of a chain store in a southeastern city. Brooker
et al, (1994), for example, use a linear version of
Capps and Nayga’s model to estimate the demand
for roast beef, steak, and ground beef. The data are
aggregated across stores to produce 153time series
observations. In addition to own and cross price
effects, they try to estimate own and cross elastic-
ities for local TV advertising and feature newspa-
per advertisements for each product. Individual
equations are estimated using ordinary least
squares with some discussion of autocomelation.
Homogeneity and symmetry are not mentioned.
Brooker et al. report significant own price elastic-
ities ranging between – 1.01 and – 1.55, and sig-
nificant negative, i.e., complementary, cross price
elasticities for ground beef. No other cross price
elasticities were significant. Own newspaper ad-
vertising effects are positive and significant as hy-
pothesized but TV advertising only has a signifi-
cant (f30sitive)effect for roast beef. Cross adver-
tising’’effects kre generally not significant.
This is not the forum for critically assessing the
contribution of these papers to demand analysis.
They are to be credited for pioneering the use of
scanner data. Yet, the advent and wide scale adop-
tion of the Neilsen and IRI commercial data ser-
vices by the industry is replacing ad hoc local mar-
ket data collection efforts and allows much more
precise and comprehensive analysis of marketing
questions.
Iskow and others at the University of Vermont
are currently using IRI Infoscan data to analyze
demand for maple syrup (Iskow et al., 1994).
They have purchased quadweeldy data for a four
year period (1988-1991) for four standard Metro-
politan Statistical Areas in the Northeastern United
States. It includes prices, quantities, and promo-
tional activities for price and imitation maple syrup
brands. Iskow et al. estimate price, income, and
promotion elasticities for five leading brands.
They use a double log specification and Zellners
seemingly unrelated regression method with au-
toregressive disturbances. Prices are assumed to be
exogenous, and homogeneity and symmetry re-
strictions are not considered, Iskow et al. report
significant negative own price elasticities at the
brand level and find that larger share brands have
lower elasticities. They report positive and signif-
icant cross price and promotional effects.
Industrial Organization Analysis
Even less work on the firm strategies in oligopo-
listic markets has been done with scanner data,
because such work requires information across
several firms and/or markets as well as products.
One can’t use samples of a few supermarkets from
one firm in one market. Using the IRI Infoscan
Hailer (1993, 1994) has analyzed the relationship
between brand market share and price. 3All brands
are pooled across local markets and over quarters
for 1988–1992. Given this panel data, a fixed ef-
fect estimation approach is used. For cottage
cheese he reports that brands that have larger
shares have significantly higher prices. For coop-
erative brands, however, there is no significant
share price relationship and cooperative presence
in a local market tends to lower proprietary cheese
brand prices. Farmer cooperatives seem to be vol-
ume rather than profit oriented, possibly to move
members’ product and reduce milk surpluses.
Hailer also has done work on the catsup industry
(1994). Cotterill and Hailer (1994) describe the
local market structure and conduct of the ice
cream, butter, margarine, cottage cheese, and fluid
milk industries.
Chevalier (1993, 1994) uses IRI data in a very
different and unique study. She develops a model
of oligopoly that incorporates financial leverage.
Depending on how leverage is modeled, she dem-
onstrates in a duopoly framework that debt can
transform a firm into a tough (lowers price) or soft
(raises price) competitor. The actual outcome is an
empirical question. Chevalier tests her theories on
the supermarket industry where many leading
firms underwent leveraged buyouts during the
1980s. As an MIT graduate student she was able,
3 Afthoughthe data are retail data, note that the firms under anefysis
are foodmanufacturers. Controlvariablesforretaifmarkupsare included
in these medels.128 October 1994
through an MIT professor who sits on the IRI
Board of Directors, to obtain Infoscan data for in-
dividual chains in local IRI markets. Normally,
IRI refuses to identify individual chains and pro-
vides only market area price for a particular prod-
uct. Chevalier reports that leveraged supermarket
chains did, ceteris paribus, charge significantly
higher prices than non-leveraged chains in local
markets. In fact she found that for 10 of the 17
local markets she analyzed all LBO chains were
higher priced than non-LBO chains (1994, p. 23).
Her model, however, does not include retail cost
and market structure variables such as firm market
share or retail concentration ratios. One wonders
how their inclusion would affect her results.
111.Specific Examples of IRI Data
As the work by Hailer and Chevalier suggest, the
market level commercial scanner data bases,
Neilsen Scantrak or IRI Infoscan, are the most ap-
propriate to analyze both demand and strategic in-
teractions. Often a chart that illustrates relatively
simple relationships can communicate more about
a topic than equations or words. This section con-
tains a set of charts to illustrate different research
topics that the IRI Infoscan data can address. Fig-
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ure 1 displays the quarterly price and volume
movement data for the three leading brands of mar-
garine in Chicago for 1988–1991. The IRI Info-
scan data base has 47 such local markets in 1988
and the number increases to 65 in 1992. These data
for Chicago clearly seem to trace out demand re-
lationships for each brand. If one ignores the fact
that these three brands are being sold simulta-
neously and pools the data to estimate a demand
curve for “branded” margarine, one clearly ob-
tains a strong hyperbolic relationship.
Since this is market and not household level data
one probably should not assume price to be exog-
enous. In the next section we will endogenize
price. Here, however, if one examines data for one
city over time, the assumption of Capps and
Nayga, Brooker and Eastman and Iskow et al. that
prices are exogenous seems appropriate at least as
a working assumption. Market demand may be
rather stable and exogenous shocks to an unstable
supply curve may identify a demand curve.
Figure 2 illustrates the impact of the ConAgra
acquisition of Beatrice Foods upon Hunt’s Catsup,
a leading Beatrice brand. The vertical line in Fig-
ure 2 indicates the date of the merger. Prior to the
merger, the pricing of Hunt’s Catsup tended to
follow industry and seasonal patterns. After the
merger Hunt’s Catsup follows a distinctly different
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Figure 2. Catsup Prices: Total U.S.
and steadily increasing price trend. Data from
Leading National Advertisers indicate advertising
for Hunt’s Catsup was cut, and Hunt’s market
share decreased from 22.2 percent in 1989 to 20,1
percent in 1992.4 The merger seems to have trig-
gered a unilateral exercise of market powe~ other
firms, including the leader Heinz, did not follow
Hunt’s price lead.
Figure 3 tracks another major recent event in
food markets. During late 1989 the Minnesota-
Wisconsin price for manufacturing milk skyrock-
eted from $10.98 in May to $14.93 per hundred-
weight in December because of a temporary milk
short fall. In 1990 it plummeted as farmers in-
creased production rapidly and substantial milk
surpluses reappeared. Figure 3 displays prices in-
dices (quarter 1 1988 equals 100) for the Minne-
sots-Wisconsin milk price, private label and Kraft
American Cheese. These indices allow us to ex-
amine how farm level price changes are transmit-
ted to the retail level. Retail prices tend to lag farm
prices by a quarter, and retail price increases are
lower than milk prices prior to the peak Minnesota-
Wisconsin price. This is to be expected since raw
milk is only one cost factor in retail cheese prices
and other cost factors tend to be less volatile. 5
With these caveats, farm and retail price changes
seem to track each other quite closely prior to the
peak in the Minnesota-Wisconsin price series.
Thereafter, they diverge. Private label cheese price
follow Minnesota-Wisconsin milk prices down
with a distinct lag. The fact that they do not drop
as much represents the converse of the fact that
they do not increase as rapidly when raw milk
prices rise.
Price conduct in Figure 3 for Kraft American
Cheese, is distinctly different from private label
conduct. Retail price continues to rise for several
quarters after the Minnesota-Wisconsin milk price
break in the fourth quarter of 1989. Kraft’s con-
duct did not go unnoticed and resulted in congres-
sional hearings on cheese prices. Since the data
exist at the brand level and for major local markets
as well as the total U.S., one can analyze geo-
graphic and brand or firm specific price transmis-
sion. Clearly, more detailed analysis of the IRI
data can contribute to our understanding of the
farm to retail price transmission process.
4 See Hailer (1994a) for a detailed analysis of catsup pricing and
Hailer (1994b) for a detailed analysis of the impact of the ConAgra
acquisition rrpnnthe price and advertising strategy of Beatrice’s leadlng
fond brands.
5 If raw milk costs account for only 50 percent of retail cheese price
then a 20 percent increase in milk price, ceferis paribus, produces only
a 10percent increase in cheese price.130 October 1994 Agricultural and Resource Economics Review
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Figure 3. Price Index Trends: Total U.S.
IV. Brand Level Demand Analysis in a
Differentiated Oligopoly
Neoclassical demand analysis usually focuses
upon distinctly different commodities, for exam-
ple, butter versus margarine or beef versus pork.
Firm or brand level demand analysis introduces the
organization of the industry in direct and unavoid-
able fashion. The demand estimation problem be-
comes particularly problematic when the industry
is an oligopoly that sells differentiated products.
Endogenizing prices is not sufficient. Price inter-
dependence between brands complicates the spec-
ification of supply relationships. One cannot as-
sume, for example, that the price of Pepsi remains
constant when the price of Coke changes due to
shift in a cost variable or a desire for a higher profit
margin. Some degree of price followship or tacit
collusion often exists among brands in concen-
trated oligopolies.
Baker and Breshnahan (1985) were the first in-
dustrial organization economists to consider care-
fully the potential benefits of combining demand
and industrial organization concepts to analyze
pricing in a differentiated oligopoly. Their ap-
proach, however, uses residual demand models
that rely upon fairly restrictive supply side behav-
ioral assumptions (Froeb and Werden 1991),
Brand level analysis of demand and market
power can be based upon a more general theory,
that I will present here. Assume that an industry is
differentiated and that Bertrand competition, oc-
curs, i.e. price is the strategic variable.6 Then the
demand for brand 1 in this industry of n brands is:
91 = 91(P1 . . pn, D)
Where:
ql = the quantity of brand 1
PI =pieceofbrandi= l.. .n
D = a vector of demand shift variables in-
cluding income.
Taking the derivative of this equation, with respect
to PI, using the chain rule to account for oligopo-
6 See, for example, Deneckere and Davidson (1985), Scherer and
ROSS (1990, p, 19%206).Cotterill
listic price interdependence, and some algebraic
manipulation yield the following formula for the
observable price elasticity of demand.
observable price elasticity for brand 1
partial own price elasticity of demand
firm 1 cross price elasticity with re-
spect tO Pi
rivals’ price response elasticity (the
percent than e in pi when p, changes
% one percent).
Baker and Breshnahan commence their anal-
ysis with a similar formula, however, they analyze
perceived as opposed to actual observable demand
elasticities because they consider l jl to be brand
one manager’s perceived or conjectured price re-
sponse by rival i to a change in brand one’s price.
Later to estimate their model they implicitly as-
sume conjectures are consistent, i.e., brand one
manager’s conjecture about a rival’s price response
is equal to the actual observed price reaction by
that rival when brand one price changes. For clar-
ity I make the assumption explicit and up front.
Note that a brand’s observable own price elas-
ticity has two general components. The first is the
familiar partial own price elasticity. In industrial
organization analysis we describe this as the non-
followship demand elasticity because it quantifies
the impact on brand demand when the price in-
creases and no rival brands prices change. The
nonfollowship price elasticity measures the unilat-
eral market power of the brand (Federal Merger
Guidelines, Section 2. 11). The second component
of the actual price elasticity measures the coordi-
nated market power component of a brand’s ob-
servable elasticity, If other brand managers behave
in a tacitly collusive fashion and follow the eleva-
tion (or reduction) of brand one’s price, then the ~il
in equation 1 are positive. Assuming all products
in the industry are substitutes, i.e., different
brands compete with each other for customers, the
cross price elasticities, ~il, are also positive. Thus
to the extent that coordinated market power exists,
it makes the observed own price elasticity less
elastic than the partial own price elasticity.
Two special cases are worth mentioning. The
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first is when all ~il are zero and is the nonfollow-
ship case discussed above. The second special case
is when tacit collusion is perfect. Given the con-
sistent conjunctures assumption, all l il are one.
When tacit collusion is perfect the observed own
price elasticity is the partial price elasticity plus the
sum of the cross price elasticities which is positive,
so demand is less elastic.
Figure 4 illustrates these demand relationships
for each individual brand. I have used the elastic-
ities to draw a linear approximation at around point
PI QI of what may be nonlinear demand curves.s
Assume the market is in equilibrium at PI Q1 and
the managers for brand 1 decide to raise price to
P2. In this example observed output decreases to
QO.If there was perfect tacit collusion, it would
have declined only to QF and if there was no tacit
collusion output would have declined to Q~F. One
constructs a measure of the degree of unilateral
market power by dividing the slope of the nonfol-
lowship demand curve by the slope of the fellow-
ship demand curve. This is the Rothschild Index
(Greer p, 99). A more general definition that flows
from my analysis is the ratio of the followship
elasticity, ~f’, to the nonfoilowship elasticity, q ~~.
Rothschild Index ~R1) = fi
‘fill
Under perfect competition the slope of the nonfol-
lowship demand curve would be zero (q ~~is infi-
nitely negative) and the Rothschild Index is zero.
If the nonfollowship demand curve is identical to
the fellowship then all cross price elasticities of
demand must be zero and the brand effectively has
a monopoly position.
One can define a second measure of observed
(i.e., combined unilateral and coordinated) market
power, by dividing the slope of the observed de-
mand by the followship demand. Again, a more
general definition would be the ratio of the fellow-
ship elasticity, q:, to the observed elasticity, q~, If
there is no unilateral or coordinated power this
index is zero and it ranges to one if observed de-
mand equals followship demand. This index is
new to the field and I chose to call it the O Index.
Thus, we have:
and05RISO151
7 In certain price reaction models it is possible to measure both con-
jectures about prices and acturdprice reactions and to test for consistent
(Llang).
8Constant elasticity demandcurves am nonlinearandother functional
forms such as the double log and almost ideal demand system also
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Figure 4. Theoretical Demand Relationships for a Brand in a Differentiated Oligopoly (iinear
approximation).
The O Index of observed market power is always
greater than or equal to the Rothschild Index of
unilateral market power because it includes coor-
dinated market power.
Finally one can decompose the observed market
power into the proportion that is due to coordinated





It gives the proportion of observed market power
that is due to tacit collusion. Again this index is
new to the industrial organization field, and is
named in recognition of Edwin Chamberlain, the
economist who gave the English language the
word’ ‘oligopoly” and who provided the first theo-
retical analysis of tacit collusion (1933).
When discussing the Rothschild Index Greer
states:
. the Rothschild Index provides only one
answer to the question “How market power
should be measured?” And it is not necessarily
the best answer. Its greatest shortcoming is its
purely theoretical nature. In practice it is not
possible to estimate the index accurately . . .
[Greer 1990p. 101].
Since the Rothschild index provides only “one art-
swer, ” there is need for additional measures such
as the O and Chamberlainindices. Also, this paper
demonstrates that the IRI or Neilsen brand level
data now allow precise estimation of these indices.
To illustrate I will present provisional estimates
of the own price, cross price and price response
elasticities and the Rothschild, O, and Chamberlain
Indices for a set of competing branded products.
This work employs the linear approximate almost
ideal demand system (LA/AIDS) as developed by
Deaton and Muellbauer (1980) to model the regu-
lar soft driuk brands.g In this paper I assume that
the regular carbonated soft drink group is a rele-
vant product market. Although I actually estimate
a demand system for nine regular soft drink cate-
gories, for expository purposes assume the system
9 Ultimately, regular anddiet demand system estimates will be part of
a two stage budgetframeworkto estimate cross priceeffects between the
two groups,Cotlerill








sz = ~z + dzllnp] + dzzlnpz + 13zlog ~
+ (322D
where:
si = the market share of brand i = 1, 2
Pi = the price of brand i = 1, 2
X = the expenditures on the two brand
category
in p = sllnpl + szlnpz (Stone’s linear ap-
proximation price index)
D = a vector of demand shift variables
The LA/AIDS is a specific functional form for the
general demand equations presented as equations 1
and 2. The linear approximate form substitutes
Stone’s price index for a more general weighted
price index because that index requires non-linear
estimation. Deaton and Muellbauer demonstrate
that LA/AIDS model has desirable aggregation
properties and is a preferred functional form for
analyzing market level data. The homogeneity and
symmetry restrictions of consumer demand theory
can be readily imposed. In the two good models
they are:
Homogeneity: 1311 + d12 = O, d21 + 13zz= O
Symmetry: a21= (3,*
Green and Alston (1990) provide an algorithm for
computing own and cross price elasticities from
the LA/AIDS model. Chalfant (1987) provides a
method for computing standard errors for elastici-
ties. Strictly speaking the vector of demand shift
variables, D, should be introduced in a non linear
fashion as part of a generalized expenditure index,
however linear estimation is possible with the cur-
rent specification so we retain it.
Turning now to the supply side of the model,
each oligopolist seeks to maximize profits. We as-
sume Bertrand competition, i.e., price not quantity
is the strategic choice variable. In the duopoly ex-
ample one has:
MAX~i = piqi = ci(q~,‘-i) ./br i = 1, 2
wrt pi
where:
c~(qi> ~J the brand i total cost function
~i) IS brand i input price vector
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One can use the first order condition and the
brand demand curve to solve for each brand’s price
reaction function. Liang (1989) provides a linear
example that can readily be extended to the double
log specification. Derivation of the exact func-
tional form of the price reaction curves for the
LA/AIDS model is not feasible, however Hong
Wen, Lawrence Hailer and I have made some
progress for the AIDS model with its more general
price index, Our basic results indicate that the fol-
lowing functional form is appropriate.
Since the price reaction functions are logarithmic
in prices, the coefficients on the other brand’s
price, E12,e21,are the price response elasticities.
In the two brand example the two demand equa-
tions and the two price reaction equations seem to
constitute a four equation simultaneous system
with brand market shares, S1and Szand prices, pl
and p2, are endogenous variables. However, the
adding up property of the LA/AIDS demand sys-
tem means that for n demand equations one esti-
mates n – 1, and recovers the parameter estimates
for the n’hequation from them. Heuristically, since
the market shares of the brands in our two brand
example sum to 1, if one has an estimate of one
share, one also knows the other. Thus, in the two
brand example one actually estimates a three equa-
tion simultaneous system with three endogenous
variables.
Let us now turn to an empirical example for
regular soft drinks. The seven leading brands are
Coke, Pepsi, Royal Crown Cola (RC), Sprite,
Seven-Up (7-Up), Doctor Pepper (Dr Pep), Moun-
tain Dew (Mt Dew). These brands plus private
label regular soda (PrivLab) averaged 75 percent
of regular soft drink sales in 1988-1990. All other
soft drink brands are aggregated into a brand la-
beled another. The resulting simultaneous equa-
tion system that is estimated includes (nine minus
one) eight demand equations and nine price reac-
tion equations with 17 endogenous share and price
variables. Homogeneity ands ymmetry restrictions
are imposed on the demand system.
Appendix Tables A1–A3 report the variables
used in the analysis, system specification and de-
scriptive statistics. The data set includes 12 quar-
terly observations (1988-1990) for 45 IRI local
market areas. As such, it is a balanced panel data
set with 540 observations. An error components134 October 1994 Agricultural and Resource Economics Review
Table Al. System of Demand and Price Reaction Equations, Remdar Carbonated Soft Drinks
Shrcok, = a. + a ,Pcoke + %ppep.i + ~3pRC + ~4PsPrite + ‘5P7UP + %f’DrPep
+ c@’MtD.w + a8pPrivLab + ‘# AllOther + a ,&xpenditureX + a, ~FeaturecOke
i- a,2DisplaycOke -t ci,J?elTVAdvcOke + a ,4Temperature
ShrpeP,i = PO + ~,Pc.~. + @2PPep., + ~3pRC + ~4pSPri1e + fi5p7UP + ~#DrPeP
+ p7PMtDew + p8Pp,ivLab + 13#A,,other + ~ ,&xpenditureX -t ~, ,Feamre~.P.,
+ ~12DisplaypeP,i + p ,3RelTVAdvP,P,i + ~ ~dTemperature
ShrRc = ~~ + V,PcO~. + Y2p@M + y3PRC + y4pspri,e + ~5p7up + ~#DrPep
+ ?7PMtDew + y8pPri.Lob + ~#AUOther + y,&xpenditureX -!- y, ,Feature~c
+ -y,2DisplayRc + y ,3RelTVAdvRc + y ,4Temperature
[ShrA,,o,ke, = 80 + b ]Pcoti + ~2PPePSi + 63PRC + ~4PsPrite + ~5P7uP + 6#DrPeP
+ 87PM,Dew + ?i8Pp,ivkb + 8#A,,o,her + 6, &xpenditureX + 8,, FeatureAl,o,he,
+ 8,2DisplayA,,oth., + 6,3RelTVAdvAl,o,~e, + 8,4Temperature]
P Coke = K. + K,ShrcOk. + K2Pepst + K3PRC + K41’sp,it. + K5P7UP + K#D,pep + K7pM,Dew
+ K8Pp,ivLob + KgfA,,ozh,, + K,&xpenditureX + K,, Temperature + K, *FeaturecOke
+ K,3DisplaycOk, + K,4UnitlVolcOk, + K,J/elTVAdvcOk. + K1#upMktlGrocSale
+ K,,MktCR4 + K, ~population + K,~weetner + KmCokeCaptive
PPqmi = k. + h ,ShrpeP,i + k#c.k, + &pRC + A4psp,ite + &pwP + ‘#’DrPeP + ~TpMIDeW
+ A8Pp,ivtib + k#Atlolhe, + A,&xpenditureX + A, ,Temperature + A,2FeaturepeP,L
+ A1@isplaypeP.{ + k ,4UnitlVolPeP.i + k ,@elTVAdvpeP,i + k, #upMktlGrocSale
+ A,7MktCR4 + A,8Poptdation + A,~weetner + k2#epsiCaptive
P~c = I). + 4Jhr~~ + dJ2pc.~, + Wp.psi l ~dpsprite l ~S1’TUP f ~&’DrPep + ~7pMtDew
+ ~8Pp,ivLab + ~#A,lo,~e, + @,@xpenditureX i- t),, Temperature + ~,2Feature~c
+ ~, @isplayRc + ~,4UnitlVolRc + t/s,5RelTVAdvRc i- ~l&SupMktlGrocSale
-1-~,7MktCR4 + IJI~Population + iJIJ’weetner
PAUO,her = ‘~ + co ,ShrA1lo,he, + m2PCoke + ~3PPePW + tI)4PRc + USPSp,j,. + @7up + ‘7pDrPqJ
+ to8P~,~eW + C@p,ivtib + w,@xpenditureX + m,, Temperature + w, 2FearureAllothe,
+ w ,~is@ayAllOthw + o ,4Unit/ VolA,,o,~,, + m, #?elTVAdvA,,o,he, + co,.#upMktlGrocSale
+ w ,7MktCR4 i- m,8Population i- w,$weetner
and three stage least squares estimation routine
was used to estimate the model’s parameters.’0
Table 1 reports own and cross price elasticities
and significance levels. Elasticities are computed
from the LA/AIDS coefficient estimates using
Green and Alston’s formula iii (1990, p. 494).
Significance levels are based upon standard errors
computed using the Chalfont (1987) method.
Coke’s partial own price elasticity is – 1,496.
Pepsi is somewhat more elastic at – 1.868. These
measures of unilateral market power, i.e., nonfol-
lowship demand, indicate that if Coke or Pepsi
raise price and no other brand follows, their reve-
nue declines. Such a price increase may however
still be profitable. If profits are 10 percent of sales
then increasing price 10 percent doubles the profit
10This is ~mndom rafier than fixed effects approach. Since manYOf
our exogenous vuriables ure essentially cross section variables, e.g.,
market area population, in Table A1, a fixed effects approach is not
applicable. It wipes out all cross sectinn variables (Hausman andTaylor
1981).
margin of an output that is only 14,9 percent lower
for Coke or 18.6 percent lower for Pepsi. 1*
Note that the cross price elasticities for Coke
and Pepsi are .35 and significant. The implication
is if these brands tend to follow each other on price
(tacitly collude) then the observed own price elas-
ticity will be less than the nonfollowship elasticity
reported in Table 1. For example, if there is fully
collusive pricing between Coke and Pepsi (and all
other brands do not follow their lead) then Coke’s
observed price elasticity would be – 1.496 + .355
= 1.141, Pepsi’s would be – 1.86 + .353 =
– 1.507. A merger between these two brands is
equivalent to establishing fully collusive pricing,
so if they actually were practicing nonfollowship
pricing before the merger, it clearly increases their
market power.
Briefly examining some other brands, Royal
II see Langan and Cot@rill(1994) for a more explicit example that
uses actual company profit sales ratios, The basic point still holds.Cotterill Scanner Data 135
Table A2. Description of Variables and Related Notes
SHRcOke the percent of regular carbonated soft drink expenditures spent on Coca Cola
ShrP,P,t the percent of regular carbonated soft drink expenditures spent on Pepsi
Shr~c the percent of regular carbonated soft drink expenditures spent on RC
Shr~Pri,, the percent of regular carbonated soft drink expenditures spent on Sprite
Shr7uP the percent of regular carbonated soft drink expenditures spent on 7Up
Shr~rPeP the percent of regular carbonated soft drink expenditures spent on Dr Pepper
Shr~,~eW the percent of regular carbonated soft drink expenditures spent on Mountain Dew
ShrP,ivh, the percent of regular carbonated soft drink expenditures spent on Private Label
ShrALlo,her the percent of regular carbonated soft drink expenditures spent on All Other Brands
P_ naturat log of price of brand
Expenditure natural log of (regular carbonated soft drkrk expenditures divided by a price index*)
Feature _ percent of brand’s volume sold with feature advertising
Display _ percent of brand’s volume sold with displays and point of purchase promotions
Unif/Vol _ number of units brand divided by the volume sold of brand
RelTVAd _ brand’s national TV advertising as a percent of the leader
Temperature mean temperature in local market for a given quarter
SupMktlGrocSale the percentage of all grocery sales in local market made by supermarkets
MktCR4 percentage of all grocery sales in local market made by top 4 grocery chains
Sweetner price of most frequently used sweetner during study period (higher fructose com syrup)
Population population in local market
CokeCaptive binary variable to indicate a Coca Cola Co.-owned bottler for the local market
PepsiCaptive binary variable to indicate a Pepsi Co.-owned bottler for the local market
*Stone’s linear approximate price index was used, ie., (supra, p. 316)
Crown Cola which is priced significantly below
the leading regular soft drink brands and marketed
as a “value” brand (Duvall 1993, p. 60, 69) is the
most elastic brand ( – 2.50). Private label regular
soda performs in a very strange fashion. One
would expect it also to be very elastic but it is the
most inelastic brand, – .94. This seems to suggest
that private label soda has more unilateral market
power than all other brands and could increase
both revenues and profits by increasing prices. Pri-
vate label also has a fairly large negative cross
price elasticity with RC and RC has a huge,
– ,758, cross price elasticity with private label.’2
They clearly are strong complements. This sug-
gests that they should be aggregated into a com-
mon “value brand” for the analysis of market
power. The resulting own price elasticity probably
could be more in line with the others.
Significant complements rather than substitute
relationships also crop up elsewhere in Table 1.
Sprite, a clear soda, for example, has a negative
(complementary) cross price elasticity ( – .090) in
the Coke demand equation and Coke is a comple-
ment in the Sprite equation. Since these brands are
12me imPo~itionof sYrnme~requires that the cross price coeffi-
cients in the LA/AIDS model be equal. Cross price elasticities canand
dodifferwhenbrandshavedifferentmarketshares.
both produced by the Coca Cola Company the re-
sults do provide some evidence on the extent to
which companies position and market products as
complements rather than substitutes. Mountain
Dew, a Pepsico brand, however has a positive
(substitute) cross price elasticity in the Pepsi de-
mand equation (row 2 of Table 1).
Complementary demand relationships were not
expected among these ostensibly competing regu-
lar soft drink products. Intuitively what seems to
occur is that when Coke, for example, lowers its
price shoppers are attracted to the aisle and pickup
some Sprite as a complementary product to pro-
vide “variety” or a clear soda for the uncola
crowd. Other strong complementary relationships
exist for the following two pairs: Seven-Up and
private label, and Mountain Dew and Dr. Pepper.
Table 2 presents estimates of the price reaction
function elasticities for each brand. Reading across
row one, one can see that a 1 percent increase in
Pepsi price increases Coke price by .506 percent.
A similar percentage point increase for RC only
raises Coke price .079 percent; for Sprite, Coke
price increases .177 percent; and for Seven-Up,
Coke increases .129 percent.
Note that increases in Dr. Pepper, Mountain
Dew and “all others” result in significantly lower
Coke prices. Negative price reaction coefficients
were not expected. In a linear demand and reaction136 October 1994 Agricultural and Resource Economics Review
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Tablel. Ownand Cross Price Elasticities for Regular Carbonated Soft Drinks1



























































































lElasticities are read from left to right;
** = l~o significance level
* = 5% significarrcelevel
+ = 10% significance level
*tstatistics for’ ‘AUOther” are approximated in that covariancesbetweenexpenditure andprice coefficients are not accountedfor
in calculating standarderrors of the elasticities. These approximationsarereasonablebecausethe covariancesbetweenexpendhure
and price coefficients for the other brands are quite small (the significance levels in these other equations do not change if these
covariances are excluded in the calculation of the standard errors of the elasticities). Source: University of Connecticut, Food
Marketing Policy Centev Computations from IRI Infoscan data base.
function system reaction coefficients are negative
only if the associated cross price elasticity is neg-
ative (Liang 1989). Stated otherwise, positive
cross price elasticities are sufficient to ensure pos-
itive corresponding price reaction coefficients. Our
preliminary work with AIDS demand model sug-
gests this constraint is not dependent upon the lin-
ear demand assumption. Perhaps it should be im-
posed upon to model along with the homogeneity
and symmetry restrictions of demand theory.
A second way to interpret the reaction elastici-
ties reported in Table 2 is to examine a column.
Column one, for example, indicates how the prices
of each soft drink change when Coke increases its
price by one percent. Note that, except for Sprite,
all other brands follow Coke’s price increase. Sim-
ilarly in column two all statistically significant re-
action elasticities indicate that brands follow a
Pepsi price increase. In contrast, every brand re-
actins in a significant negative fashion to a price
increase by the “all other” brands. These results
may be sensible in that the leading brands generate
“respect and price followship” and the fringe is
indeed competitive. However, I will question the
reliability of these results until we develop less
rigorous explanation for negative cross price elas-
ticities and negative reaction elasticities or decide
that a cross equation constraint equating the signs
of cross price and reaction elasticities is appropri-
ate. Note that in Table 2, all of the other cross
price elasticities in the last column are negative
and significant. Imposing a constraint that would
require the same sign for corresponding cross price
elasticities may produce very different results.
Table 3 provides computed values for the non-
followship observed and fully collusive elasticities
for each brand. The nonfollowship elasticities are
the diagonal elements from Table 1. The fully col-
Table 2. Price Reaction Elasticities for Regular Carbonated Soft Drinksl
Coke Pepsi RC Sprite 7up DrPep MtDew PrivLab AllOther
Coke — 0.506** 0.079 0.177* O.129* -0.133” – 0.230* 0.005 –0.211**
Pepsi 0.555** — –0.035 –o.175t o.121t 0.037 0.214* 0.004 -0.194**
RC 0.684** – 0,002 — -0.188 0.131 0.076 -0.156 –0.017 –0.171**
Sprite 0.070 0.302* –0.070 — 0.307** –0.061 – 0.082 0.046 –0.197**
7up -0.130 0.414** O.lllt 0.419** — -0.007 –0.350** – 0.077** – 0.083*
DrPep 0.432** 0.431** 0.103 –0.140 0.196** — – 0.461** 0.009 –0.165**
MtDew 0.424** o. 177* –0.041 –0.133 o.l19t 0.142* — –0.041 -0.169**
PrivLab 0.082 0.120 0.213* – 0.087 -0.011 0.036 –0.044 — –0.132**
AllOther O.41O** –0.077 –0.031 -0.158t 0.208** 0.092 – 0.009 –0.168”” —
1 Elasticities are read from left to right;
** = 1% significance level
* = 5q. signific~ce level
t = 10% Jgnificance level
Source: University of Connecticut, Food Marketing Policy Centeq Computations from IRI Infoscan data base.138 October 1994 Agricultural and Resource Economics Review
Table 3. Brand Elasticity Measures and Market Indices
Non-Fellowship Observed Fully Collusive Rothschild o Chamberlain
Elasticity Elasticity Elasticity Index Index Quotient
Coke – 1,496 – 1.276 –1,073 0.717 0,841 0.147
Pepsi –1,868 –1,571 –1,109 0.594 0.706 0.159
RC –2.508 –2.618 –0.535 0.213 0.204 –0.044
Sprite – 1,248 –1.436 – 1.028 0.824 0,716 –0.151
7up –1.881 –1,704 –0.794 0.422 0.466 0.094
DrPep – 1.453 –1,457 –0.974 0.670 0,669 – 0.002
MtDew – 1,307 –0,950 –1.139 0.872 1.199 0.273
PrivLab –0,918 –0.896 –0.828 0.902 0.924 0.024
AllOther –1,134 –1,173 –0,937 0.826 0.799 –0.034
lusive (fellowship) elasticities are the sum of the
rows in Table 1. The observed elasticity for a
brand is computed using equation one and is the
vector product of the brand’s row of demand elas-
ticities in Table 1 with its column of reaction elas-
ticities in Table 2.13 Table 3 also computes the
Rothschild, O, and Chamberlain indices for each
brand. For Coke, Pepsi, Seven-Up, and Private
Label these indices behave as expected. Coke, for
example, has a nonfollowship elasticity equal to
– 1.496 and its fully collusive elasticity is – 1.073
so the Rothschild index is .71 and indicates a sub-
stantial amount of unilateral market power. The
observed elasticity falls between the nonfollowship
and fully collusive elasticity and produces in con-
junction with the latter an O Index of unilateral and
coordinated market power equal to ,841. The
ChamberlainQuotient indicates that 14.7 percent of
Coke’s market power is due to tacit collusion.
Other brands in Table 3 produce results that,
quite frankly, were not expected and suggest the
need for a broader conceptualization of competi-
tion and strategic interaction. Complementary
(negative) cross price elasticities or negative price
reaction elasticities combine to produce negative
Chamberlainquotient for four brands (R.C., Sprite,
Dr. Pepper and All Others). Also Mountain Dew
generates an observed elasticity that is greater than
the fully collusive value. Cross equation con-
straints on cross price and reaction elasticities do
seem advisable. In conjunction with the symmetry
constraint they would ensure that observed elastic-
ities always fall between nonfollowship and fully
collusive elasticities thereby eliminating these
anomalies.
Note that even with the imposition of cross
equation constraints one can still have negative
cross price elasticities and negative corresponding
reaction function elasticities. Since the product of
two negatives is positive, the integrity of the rank
13Forpurposesof this calculationTable 2 shouldalso containones on
the diagonal to include the own price practical elasticity.
ordering of the elasticities and market power indi-
ces reported in Table 3 is restored, but now one has
complements in the formula, This leads me to sug-
gest the following proposition, brands that are stra-
tegic complements behave in a fashion that en-
hances tacit coordination. For example, if Coke
raises its price, and brand X is a strategic comple-
ment then brand X experiences lower demand for
its product. Given the downward shift in its de-
mand, brand X lowers its price to maximize profits
(a negative price reaction to the change in Coke
price). Due to symmetry brand X cross price elas-
ticity in the Coke demand equation is also nega-
tive. Consequently, a decrease in brand X price
increases demand for Coke and thereby lessens the
loss of market share due to Coke’s own price in-
crease. In other words, the observed elasticity is
less elastic than the nonfollowship elasticity.
V. Concluding Comments
If this paper raises more questions than it answers
it has served its most basic purpose, This is a new
area of theoretical and empirical inquiry. Both su-
permarket movement and household panel data
collected by IRI and A.C. Neilsen are the core data
for market research in the private sector. As these
data become more accessible to the research pub-
lic, they unquestionably will become the founda-
tion for new theory and empirical science in mar-
keting.
Demand modeling and empirical analysis of
price, advertising retailer push, and consumer pull
market strategies at the brand as well as product
category or industry level will provide consider-
ably more precise understanding of firm conduct
and household behavior.
Scanner data and the analytical approach dis-
cussed in this paper may also contribute to the
analysis of a wider range of topics including re-
source economic issues. The local market bottled
water data, for example, provide an excellent baseCotterill
for a defensive expenditure approach to the anal-
ysis of water contamination, or pollution incidents
in particular cities or for particular brands such as
the Benzine contamination of Perrier. Regarding
the former one could collect municipal water qual-
ity ratings and use them plus public discussion of
them as the stimulus variable. They may shift de-
mand for bottled water. Similarly branded product
recall due to contamination and changing food
safety perceptions may be analyzed.
In closing, I think a fundamental issue is public
access to IRI and Neilsen scanner data. To date
public access has been very limited and usually
quite expensive when approved. As this important
lane of the “information superhighway” becomes
so advanced that food marketers can micromarket
to millions of individual households, one has to
note the huge disparity in access by consumers,
public researchers, and governmental oversight
and operations staff vis a vis marketers in the pri-
vate sector. Increasing access to scanner data need
not damage or compromise strategic moves by
firms, and it could improve the overall efficiency
and performance of the food marketing system be-
havior. As this paper illustrates working at the in-
terface of demand and industrial organizations the-
ory may very well provide new theory and meth-
ods that will advance both fields. At some juncture
this work may also make a significant contribution
to the evolving quantitative focus of marketing re-
search as taught in business schools.
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